in recent social and political theory. These are deployed to attack, on the one hand, empirical political science and, on the other hand, normative theory with universalist aspirations, such as that found in the work of Rawls. Zolo argues that the complexity of modern societies and the resulting fragmentation of standards of truth doom both of these enterprises. Instead, we should begin with a view of politics as achieving "the selective regulation of social risks." We accede to political authority because this serves to reduce the uncertainties of social life, which, in the contemporary world, always tend to increase. This leads to a view of democracy that we might call neo-Schumpeterian. Zolo whole-heartedly endorses Schumpeter's famous attack on "the classical doctrine of democracy" but then goes on to argue that Schumpeter's own elite-competition model has been overtaken by recent developments. Parties no longer genuinely compete to attract the popular vote: instead, they collude with each other and establish client relationships with groups outside the political sphere. The electorate no longer possess even that minimum level of political rationality needed to make the competitive model work. Their political experience is constructed for them by the mass media, which is most effective when not engaged in overt propaganda. The resulting system, Zolo argues, no longer deserves to be called a representative democracy: "liberal oligarchy" would be more accurate.
groups. How can we be authentically female, black, gay, French-speaking, and so on but also equal citizens identifying with the laws and policies of the state? The challenge is a formidable one; and it is tempting to escape it by taking refuge in diffuse and obscure formulations in which Mouffe's book, unfortunately, abounds. Here, for instance, is the editor herself:
The creation of political identities as radical democratic citizens depends therefore on a collective form of identification among the democratic demands found in a variety of movements: women, workers, black, gay, ecological, as well as in several other "new social movements." This is a conception of citizenship which, through a common identification with a radical democratic interpretation of the principles of liberty and equality, aims at constructing a "we," a chain of equivalence among their demands so as to articulate them through the principle of democratic equivalence. (p. 236) If this means anything at all, it suggests some spontaneous tempering of conflicting group demands in the name of democracy. But why and how?
Not all the contributors to Mouffe's book are so evasive. Candid recognition of the conflict between personal identity and citizenship can be found in the chapter by Jean Leca, who draws attention to the breakdown of a common culture (in France, especially) and the increasing difficulty of establishing cultural communication between different groups (ethnic, regional, etc.), and in an elegant essay by Michael Walzer, who praises the rise of civil society as a sphere of free association but sees that it cannot fully substitute for democratic citizenship on the national scale. A robust form of republicanism is defended by Sheldon Wolin in the concluding chapter, and Mary Dietz endeavors to make this stance more appealing to feminists (though the constructive part of the argument remains somewhat undeveloped). Another robust republican, Hannah Arendt, is discussed in a helpful chapter by Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves: d'Entreves perhaps underestimates the distance that separates Arendt from the contemporary politics of identity.
One theme that is missing from Mouffe's book is the idea of deliberative democracy, defended recently by Joshua Cohen, James Fishkin, and several others. If we are to acknowledge social complexity without falling prey to the pessimistic conclusions of Zolo's realism, it is to the possibilities of democratic dialogue between competing groups that we must surely look. Stylistically, these are also two very different kinds of book. Nichols presents her novel and often controversial interpretations (e.g., that "polity" is the simply best regime, that the regime "according to prayer" is called the best only in irony, and that the best human life is impossible without political activity) in the form of a topic-by-topic and book-by-book commentary on the Politics. But her commentary is never so detailed that it fails to keep the whole text in view, thus opening her reading to question and revision by other readers of the Politics. All of us who teach the Politics, no matter how many or how few times we have done it before, will teach the book better and with more pleasure having read Nichols. The book should be of value both for experienced Aristotelians who need to see the text with a freshly invigorated eye and for beginning, nonspecialist teachers who are looking for interesting ways to problematize the Politics for their students.
Swanson's argument for her equally controversial thesis, on the other hand, ranges over Aristotle's corpus as a whole, connecting Aristotelian ideas and lines of argument that are generally not connected, rather than commenting intensively on a single text. Her claim is that-contrary to modern communitarian interpreters of varying political stripes-Aristotle's political philosophy establishes the supreme human value of a set of activities-including, but not limited to, philosophizing, the family, friendships, and the economy-that can flourish only within the private realm, activities that are inevitably threatened by the public. Her application of the private/public distinction to the text is less problematic than it may, at first glance, appear to be. While Aristotle does not speak of a distinction between private and public as such and thus does not himself explicitly assert anything about the value of either "the private" or "the public," Swanson's use of these terms as a way to open a dialogue with Aristotle is by no means an anachronistic imposition of modern concepts on a Greek text. One clear instance of a conception of "the private" in Greek philosophy is in Plato's Laws 739c-d, where the Athenian Stranger distinguishes between "what is called the private" and that which is said to be common, arguing that in the best regime everything would be common, including that which is by nature private, such as the eyes and the ears and the hands. There can be little doubt that Aristotle would both understand and reject the Stranger's claim; the modern formulation of the private/public issue would thus not be hopelessly unintelligible to the voice we can imagine speaking to us in the texts of Aristotle.
In essence, Swanson says that modern liberalism can borrow from Aristotle a defense of the private realm that is stronger than the familiar Lockean argument for the separation of private and public realms. There is a serious practical difficulty about this, however, in that Swanson's Aristotle would defend the private out of a deep mistrust of democratic public opinion, which he takes to be the principal obstacle to the development of human virtue. Thus, to accept Swanson's Aristotle on privacy, modern liberals would have to be convinced of the wisdom of abandoning their commitment to liberal democracy.
Be that as it may, Swanson's Aristotle is concerned with establishing a robust private world that might shield good and potentially good human beings against the corrupting influence of public opinion (pp. 207-08). There is, for her Aristotle, a reciprocity between private and public that is really a kind of rapprochement between the few and the many: the private sphere educates good rulers for the city, while the city, in exchange, protects the privacy and the private achievements of the more virtuous few. A central interpretive difficulty is how to make Swanson's picture square with two Aristotelian claims: (1) that a human life lived outside the laws is more likely to be beastly than angelic and (2) that for these laws to educate in virtue effectively, there must be not only widespread public consent but a significant degree of political participation, as well. When they are not actively appropriated by a majority of the citizens, the laws must fail to perform their primary function of supplying a moralizing authority that defines the city without reducing it to a unity. Swanson's response here is that the maintenance and revision of the laws and customs of any given polity are not of great concern because there is, for Aristotle, both a readily knowable natural hierarchy among human beings and a readily knowable substantive natural law to guide practical reason. (Aristotle, to most Straussians and to Nichols, seems to deny both of these things.) So long as the few who are best by nature rule, guided only by their independent judgment and by the precepts of a natural law that is embedded in the unwritten customs of every polity, there is no reason to be much troubled by those laws that make Athens distinctly Athenian.
The spin that Swanson puts on Aristotle is opposed to Arendtian and communitarian readings; but her own theoretical framework is not evident (to this reader, at least), though it seems to be in the direction of Oakeshott and possibly Voegelin, rather than Strauss. But this is never altogether clear, so it is difficult to ascertain what overall political theoretical conception supplies the context and motive for Swanson's unusual reading of Aristotle. This makes it hard to see any consistent narrative or discursive line to her argument as it moves from chapter to chapter to consider the virtues that her Aristotle thinks must be developed in the household (rather than the city), in the relation between master and slave, in the separate spheres of husband and wife, in the economic market, in friendship, and in philosophy. Her writing is sometimes awkward and stilted and conjures a very censorious and moralistic Aristotle, as though she were not yet fully comfortable with her texts. A provocative and wide-ranging study of this kind always risks relying too heavily on quirky readings of single passages taken out of context, on theory-driven readings of ambiguous passages, and on repeatedly exaggerated formulations of the point the author urgently wants us to hear. Swanson's work sometimes suffers from all these weaknesses, but her occasional stylistic infelicities do not obscure the novelty and the importance of what she has to say. There is something powerfully plausible in her assertion that Aristotle at least implies a conception of the private not as a protected space for pursuing one's own good in one's own way but as an opportunity for cultivating virtues. Swanson has read widely and well, and the book vividly calls attention to the various ways in which Aristotle's discussions of character and moral education regard public life with a much higher degree of suspicion than any ardent communitarian, ancient or modern, would display.
Mary Nichols is a master of the difficult rhetorical art of exposing her arguments to challenge without abandoning them, and because of this, her book speaks with an unusual authority that must arise from many hours intelligently spent reading and thinking and conversing about the meaning of the Politics. Citizens and Statesmen is a marvel of close reading combined with clarity and consummate accessibility. For Swanson's Aristotle, political life is neither ennobling nor challenging. For Nichols's Aristotle, it is both. Her study takes, as its point of departure, the dispute between "democratic" and "aristocratic" interpreters of the Politics, both of whom see in Aristotle a way of challenging modern liberalism by bringing to the fore qualities that liberalism seems to lack-democratic readers stressing Aristotle's focus on the importance of a political community composed of equal and participatory citizens, aristocratic readers, Aristotle's recognition of human inequality and of the importance of leadership by virtuous statesmen. Nichols's argument is that the two readings are each partially true and partially distorting; each exaggerates one element in Aristotle's political understanding, by depreciating either the extent to which Aristotle acknowledges human inequality (the typical failure of the democratic reading) or the extent to which he is aware of the dangers of falsely claiming superiority or overstating the degree of superiority of some to others (the typical failure of the aristocratic reading). Nichols's position is that good politics for Aristotle must accommodate the just claims of both the democratic many and the statesmanly few; to hold otherwise, she argues, is to court democratic or oligarchic despotism. Statesmen and democratic citizens are mutually dependent. Without some degree of democratic participation as a check on their powers, statesmen are likely to forget that they are humans subject to human limitations and incline to substitute tyranny for polity; without statesmanly leadership, citizens will fall into factional conflict and reduce the political community to civil war.
Similarly 
